An extraordinary imperial hubris seems to have gripped the upper echelons of British leadership in the Far East. Governor Shenton Thomas and C-in-C Arthur Percival took the view that putting the ‘impregnable fortress’ of Singapore into a defensible state would be bad for civilian morale. Defensive tactics were bereft of both determination and originality. Top military and civil leaders were incompetent. Untrained raw recruits were euphemistically described and deployed as ‘infantry divisions’. Critical military equipment for all three services was lacking. The failure of the defence of Singapore was not a matter of surprise and unpreparedness, but instead a catalogue of civil and military mismanagement and procrastination. The bald facts, however, are as follows: the general direction of the Japanese attack was correctly anticipated the very beaches on the north-east coast of the Malay Peninsula on which they landed had been identified and even the date of the invasion was predicted. When it came to defence, the fortifications of the ‘impregnable fortress’ – as Singapore was described – were so constructed that they faced the wrong way. It is commonly assumed that Singapore was lost because the Japanese assault on the island occurred suddenly and from an unexpected direction. More immediately, at such a critical time in the war, the disaster meant loss of valuable territories rich in minerals and natural resources, essential for the conduct of war. Never again would Britain be able to command the respect and display the confidence of a benevolent power. It was to have a profound and permanent effect on British prestige and authority, not only in the Far East but throughout the world. Churchill declared the fall of Singapore to be ‘the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history’. Just 70 days after the first Japanese landings in north Malaya, on 15 February 1942, Singapore surrendered. Japanese soldiers escort a British prisoner through the jungle.
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